Anthropomorphic intelligence

The world of Eithalica includes several species which possess what might be called “anthropomorphic intelligence;” that is, they can think and communicate rationally like humans can in real life.

Note on Terminology

Many authors have used different words for this: “sentience,” “self-awareness,” “intelligence,” etc.

This is because humanlike thought and related phenomena are a subject of philosophy, and are impossible to collectively define without resting on assumptions that come from the author’s worldview—whether the author is aware of those assumptions or not. Any definition is therefore guaranteed to be plagued with problems and limitations, and fail to please everyone.

As humans, we know that we have something unique that sets us apart from all other life on earth, but we don’t know (or can’t agree) what that something is. And in real life, there’s no evidence that any other natural creature has ever shared it.

If we see humanlike features on a cartoon animal (e.g. opposable thumbs, front-facing binocular vision, upright bipedalism, etc.) we readily describe this as a case of entertainment-driven anthropomorphism: the act of portraying a non-human creature or object with human features. Our capacity for rational thought is even more unique than any of those traits, so why should we treat it with less ownership? So far as we know, it’s as exclusive to us as if it were an identifying “fingerprint” of humanness.

As applied to aliens

Furthermore, our own experience of rational thought is the only source to draw from. Therefore whenever we imagine it in aliens, at heart this cannot be anything other than a projection of ourselves—just like when we imagine a cartoon animal that walks upright and talks. On the scale of world history, imagining such a thing at all is sort of a modern development.

Many see our current ignorance as a result of mere chronology, i.e. that we simply don’t know what aliens are like because we haven’t encountered them yet, but may at some time in the future. If we do, this would be an ideological cataclysm that would certainly justify updating the contents of this article.

Until then, many try to compensate for our anthropomorphic bias by imagining aliens as increasingly foreign and inhuman. They end up picturing Lovecraftian grotesquery, or godlike beings with a iv or v Kardashev rating, all of which in the end ring hollow and shallow against the creative oasis of anthropomorphism.

So we find that this anthropomorphic bias, while quite real, is nonetheless not something to fear or throw away. Instead, we choose to acknowledge it here in this out-of-story way, and we accept the role of the fictional world as mere entertainment that fundamentally cannot address the subject.